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Kant on the Peculiarity of the Human
Understanding and the Antinomy of the
Teleological Power of Judgment
Kant argues in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment that the first
step in resolving the problem of teleology is conceiving it correctly. He explains
that the conflict between mechanism and teleology, properly conceived, is an an-
tinomy of the power of judgment in its reflective use regarding regulative max-
ims, and not an antinomy of the power of judgment in its determining use re-
garding constitutive principles. The matter in hand does not concern objective
propositions regarding the possibility of objects or actual features of certain ob-
jects, namely, organisms. It is rather a methodological issue as to the appropriate
way to explain the generation, development, and function of organisms.¹ Taken
in this manner as subjective maxims guiding the explanation and inquiry of or-
ganisms, the principles of mechanism and teleology need not necessarily be
seen as contradictorily opposed but instead can be combined in the study of or-
ganisms. This, however, is not enough to complete the analysis of the antinomy
of the teleological power of judgment. In order to show that there is an antinomy
in this case, Kant has to establish that both seemingly conflicting maxims are
necessary and natural to the human mind.² He does it by grounding them in
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 Thus, the maxim of mechanism (the thesis) asserts that all material objects are to be ex-
plained purely mechanically, and the maxim of teleology (the antithesis) asserts that explana-
tions of some material objects cannot rest merely on mechanical principles but must appeal
to final causes.
 Accordingly, transforming mechanism and teleology into regulative maxims of the reflective
power of judgment is not enough for the completion of the discussion of the antinomy of the
teleological power of judgment. As the title of § 71 indicates, this move is only a ‘preparation’
(Vorbereitung) for the resolution of the teleological antinomy. This point has been noted by sev-
eral commentators: McFarland, John: Kant’s Concept of Teleology. Edinburgh 1970, 120 f.; Zum-
bach, Clark: The Transcendent Science: Kant’s Conception of Biological Methodology. The
Hague 1984, 142, n. 23; McLaughlin, Peter: Kant’s Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation:
Antinomy and Teleology. Lewiston 1990, 137– 140; Allison, Henry: Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological
Judgment. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement 30 (1991), 25–42, 25, 29–30, 39 (n. 1);
Grene, Marjorie and Depew, David: The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History. Cambridge
2004, 112–114; Ginsborg, Hannah: Two Kinds of Mechanical Inexplicability in Kant and Aristotle.
In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 42 (2004), 33–65, 36, n. 5; Guyer, Paul: Kant. London
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110467888-151
the ‘special character’ or peculiarity (Eigentümlichkeit) of the human under-
standing.
However, it is not entirely clear just what exactly this peculiarity of the
human understanding is. Paul Guyer argues that Kant suggests two different ac-
counts of the peculiarity of the human intellect. According to one account, this
peculiarity consists in the fact that our understanding forms general concepts
and according to another, in its propensity to proceed from the parts to the
whole. I will argue in this paper that Kant puts forward a single account, in
which the combination of these two features demonstrate the peculiarity of
the human understanding manifested in the encounter with organisms. This ac-
count explains the necessity of the regulative maxims of mechanism and teleol-
ogy,³ and thus completes Kant’s analysis of the antinomy of the teleological
power of judgment.
1 The Two-Account Interpretation
Guyer maintains that sections 76 and 77 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment
contain two different accounts of the special character of the human understand-
ing impeding a satisfactory comprehension of organisms. Consequently, com-
mentators, focusing either on the one or on the other, suggest different accounts
of the peculiarity of the human intellect and of the antinomy of the teleological
power of judgment as a whole.⁴
According to Guyer, in § 76 the peculiarity of the human understanding is ex-
pressed in the fact that it forms general concepts which cannot fully detail all the
properties of particular objects. The problem with an argument based on this fea-
ture of the human understanding is that it seems to simply echo the general ar-
gument of the introduction to the third Critique and, therefore, undermines the
special status of teleology. As Guyer explains, “while the inability of our general
concepts to explain every property of a particular may be especially salient in
2006, 346; Geiger, Ido. Is Teleological Judgment (Still) Necessary? In: British Journal for the His-
tory of Philosophy, 17 (2009), 533–566, 546 f.
 Note that the maxims of mechanism and teleology, although necessary, are regulative and
not constitutive, since they are not necessary for experience as such or for experiencing objects,
but only for organizing our experience, namely, for our quest to explain and construct systematic
theories of natural phenomena.
 Guyer (Kant, 410, n. 12) assigns to Henry Allison the account based on § 76 and to Peter
McLaughlin the account based on § 77. See Allison: Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment,
34–37; McLaughlin: Kant’s Critique of Teleology, 169– 176.
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our experience of organisms, surely this general principle is true for every phe-
nomenon in nature”.⁵
On the other hand, according to Guyer’s interpretation in § 77 the peculiarity
of the human understanding is taken to be its propensity to construct explana-
tions by moving from the properties of the parts to the whole explained thing. An
argument based on this feature of the human understanding depends on the
analysis of organisms in the Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment.
In the Analytic, Kant argues that certain functions and features of organisms
cannot be explained solely by means of the action of their parts.⁶ But such an
argument, Guyer contends, runs counter the progress of modern biology,
which “consists in the increasing ability to explain how organisms function to
preserve and reproduce themselves by means of the specific actions of their
parts”.⁷
2 An Alternative Interpretation
In contrast to Guyer, I suggest that Kant puts forward a single argument. On my
reading, these two features of proceeding from universal concepts to particular
things and from parts to wholes are intimately connected and incorporated in
a unified argument presenting a peculiarity of the human understanding coming
into play in its encounter with organisms. As we shall see, this reading also
serves to mitigate some of the difficulties that Guyer finds in Kant’s analysis
of teleology.
In the first place, consistent with his position in the Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant emphasizes again in the third Critique that the human understanding is a
discursive intellect or a faculty of concepts. That is to say, it proceeds from uni-
versal concepts to particular things given in intuition, or more specifically, by
subsuming particular things under general concepts and principles.We concep-
tualize particular phenomena by means of the concepts and principles of the un-
derstanding. Put differently, a concept of a particular phenomenon maps the
parts and features of that phenomenon. The concept, however, provides only a
limited layout of the intuited particular. Our concepts suffice to identify objects
 Guyer: Kant, 345.
 For an analysis of Kant’s argument in the Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment, see
Shimony, Idan: The Antinomies and Kant’s Conception of Nature. Tel Aviv 2013, 192– 199.
 Guyer: Kant, 345. For a reply to Guyer’s criticism of Kant’s view of biology, see Shimony, Idan:
What Was Kant’s Contribution to the Understanding of Biology? In: Kant Yearbook, 9 (2017), 159–
178.
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in certain circumstances and to describe some features and behaviors of objects,
but they never fully grasp the entire concrete particularity of individual phenom-
ena. Even empirical concepts, which present a more detailed description of phe-
nomena than the pure concepts of the understanding, do not provide a complete
characterization. Kant expresses this by claiming that there is an element of con-
tingency in the correspondence between our concept and the relevant particu-
lar.⁸
Since our concepts only partially map objects, we always proceed from the
parts mapped to the whole, which contains other features not yet explored. In-
deed, this is a feature peculiar not only to human reason, but in general to
“any finite reason that is similar to ours in quality”.⁹ A finite reason proceeds
from the incomplete knowledge of certain parts of the object to an investigation
of other parts and the whole object. This feature of the human understanding is
more crucial in the investigation of organisms than in studying inanimate phe-
nomena. Our partial knowledge and characterizations of things do not, for the
most part, prevent us from understanding inanimate phenomena. This is so be-
cause the parts and features that do figure into our characterizations of inani-
mate phenomena may suffice for the comprehension of how they come into
being and how they evolve and function.¹⁰ On the other hand, when investigat-
ing living phenomena we cannot simply proceed from the parts to the whole,
since, as Kant has shown in the Analytic, we regard living phenomena as things
in which the parts and the whole reciprocally depend on one another. In this
case, then, knowledge of the parts depends on knowledge of the whole. But
since we never have an empirical characterization of the whole, in its entirety,
an investigation of a given organism must proceed on the basis of a representa-
tion (Vorstellung) of the whole organism.
 See Kant: KU, AA 05: 406.34–407.04: “Unser Verstand hat also das Eigene für die Urtheils-
kraft, daß im Erkenntniß durch denselben durch das Allgemeine das Besondere nicht bestimmt
wird, und dieses also von jenem allein nicht abgeleitet werden kann; gleichwohl aber dieses be-
sondere in der Mannigfaltigkeit der Natur zum Allgemeinen (durch Begriffe und Gesetze) zusam-
menstimmen soll, um darunter subsumirt werden zu können, welche Zusammenstimmung unter
solchen Umständen sehr zufällig und für die Urtheilskraft ohne bestimmtes Princip sein muß.”
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 409.34–35: “keine endliche, die der Qualität nach der unsrigen ähnlich
wäre”. All references to the Critique of the Power of Judgment are to the translation by Paul
Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge 2000.
 See for instance Kant’s favorite example of wind behavior in tropical coasts: Kant: NTH, AA
01: 223–225; TW, AA 01: 492–494; BDG, AA 02: 97 f. One need not have complete concepts of the
air, sea, and land in these specific areas in order to explain this phenomenon. It suffices that one
knows that the land heats up and cools down faster than the sea and how this fact influences
the processes by which the density of various subsections of the air decreases and increases.
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The argument outlined here demonstrates that both regulative maxims of
mechanism and teleology are necessary for the explanation of organisms due
to the structure of the human understanding. This is essential for Kant’s analysis
of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment, since an antinomy ac-
cording to Kant is a conflict between principles which are necessary and natural
to the human intellect.¹¹ On the one hand, we must employ the maxim of mech-
anism, since due to the discursive character of our understanding we must ex-
plain things as the outcome of the properties and forces of their parts, which
is just what it means to explain things mechanically.¹² We must also employ
the maxim of teleology, since when investigating a thing in which the parts
and the whole reciprocally depend on one another, our inability to empirically
grasp wholes forces us to appeal to a representation of the whole thing, which
is just what it means to explain by means of final causality.¹³
since the whole would in that case be an effect (product) the representation of which would
be regarded as the cause of its possibility, but the product of a cause whose determining
ground is merely the representation of its effect is called an end, it follows that it is merely
a consequence of the particular constitution of our understanding that we represent prod-
 The antinomy of the teleological power of judgment is a conflict between necessary prin-
ciples of reason, understood as the intellectual faculty in the broader sense: it is a conflict be-
tween two maxims of the reflective power of judgment, and not between, say, assertions contin-
gently grounded on the imagination or the senses. Cf. Kant’s explication of ‘dialectic’ in § 55.
 See Kant: KU, AA 05: 408.24–27: “Wenn wir nun ein Ganzes der Materie seiner Form nach
als ein Product der Theile und ihrer Kräfte und Vermögen sich von selbst zu verbinden (andere
Materien, die diese einander zuführen, hinzugedacht) betrachten: so stellen wir uns eine mech-
anische Erzeugungsart desselben vor.” Kant: EEKU, AA 20: 236.01–04: “Da es nun ganz wider
die Natur physisch-mechanischer Ursachen ist, daß das Ganze die Ursache der Möglichkeit
der Caussalität der Theile sey, vielmehr diese vorher gegeben werden müssen, um die Möglich-
keit eines Ganzen daraus zu begreifen”.
 These features may not be uniquely peculiar to the human understanding. As noted above,
they may also be applicable to other finite understandings that are “similar to ours in quality”.
However, there is at least one conceivable understanding, to which these features do not apply,
namely, an intuitive understanding. An intuitive understanding is not constrained to move from
universals to particulars and from parts to wholes. It rather directly grasps the whole particular
in its entirety. In its representation of the whole “there is no contingency in the combination of
the parts, in order to make possible a determinate form of the whole” (Kant: KU, AA 05:
407.23–25: “dessen Vorstellung des Ganzen die Zufälligkeit der Verbindung der Theile nicht in
sich enthält, um eine bestimmte Form des Ganzen möglich zu machen”). Allison (Kant’s Antin-
omy of Teleological Judgment, 36 f.) maintains that the point of Kant’s contrast of our discursive
understanding with an intuitive understanding is to stress that the peculiar manner in which we
investigate organisms reflects a merely subjective necessity, and that it, therefore, cannot be
taken as indicating anything with respect to things themselves.
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ucts of nature as possible only in accordance with another kind of causality than that of the
natural laws of matter, namely only in accordance with that of ends and final causes.¹⁴
Kant’s analysis of the special character of the human understanding thus shows
that the regulative maxims of mechanism and teleology are necessary for the in-
vestigation of organisms. This means that in such investigations, we must find a
way to combine the maxim of mechanism, which instructs us to explain objects
in terms of the properties and forces of their parts, with the maxim of teleology,
which instructs us to regard organisms as objects in which each part has an es-
sential function in the whole and in which nothing is in vain.¹⁵ Kant maintains
that the two should be combined in the following way: whenever we discern a
purpose or function in an organism, we should mechanically investigate the
means by which the function in question is served. This is what Kant means
when he claims that the maxim of mechanism has to be ‘subordinated’ to that
of teleology.¹⁶
3 Implications and Conclusions
The interpretation presented in this paper suggests a coherent and unified read-
ing of Kant’s text, one which does not break it into unconnected segments. Fur-
thermore, it shows how the concluding sections of the Dialectic complete Kant’s
analysis of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment by explaining
why the regulative maxims of mechanism and teleology are necessary and nat-
urally inhere in the human intellect. And most importantly, this interpretation
resolves some of the difficulties that commentators find in Kant’s discussion.
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 408.02–10: “Da das Ganze nun aber alsdann eine Wirkung, Product, sein
würde, dessen Vorstellung als die Ursache seiner Möglichkeit angesehen wird, das Product aber
einer Ursache, deren Bestimmungsgrund bloß die Vorstellung ihrer Wirkung ist, ein Zweck
heißt: so folgt daraus, daß es bloß eine Folge aus der besondern Beschaffenheit unseres Ver-
standes sei, wenn wir Produkte der Natur nach einer andern Art der Causalität, als der der Na-
turgesetze der Materie, nämlich nur nach der der Zwecke und Endursachen, uns als möglich vor-
stellen.”
 See Kant: KU, AA 05: 376.11–14: “ein organisirtes Product der Natur ist das, in welchem
alles Zweck und wechselseitig auch Mittel ist. Nichts in ihm ist umsonst, zwecklos, oder
einem blinden Naturmechanism zuzuschreiben.” Kant: KU, AA 05: 420.17– 19: “in einem orga-
nisirten Wesen nichts von dem, was sich in der Fortpflanzung desselben erhält, als unzweckmä-
ßig zu beurtheilen”.
 See Kant: KU, AA 05: 414.12–27.
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First, on my reading the regulative maxim of mechanism requiring to explain
from the parts to the whole is not an arbitrary supplement to the transcendental
structure presented in the first Critique but rather depends on it. Kant does not
introduce here, as Peter McLaughlin argues, a second peculiarity,¹⁷ one which is
entirely different from the constitutive discursive peculiarity established in the
first Critique and which, therefore, may seem to exhibit merely psychological
subjective necessity. As we have seen, the requirement to mechanically explain
from the parts to the whole is closely connected to the fundamental discursivity
of the human intellect. Kant relies here on the original characterization of the
human understanding in the first Critique: rather than arbitrarily adding a fur-
ther feature to this characterization, he draws from it implications to our explan-
ations of natural phenomena. Neither is the maxim of mechanism introduced
into Kant’s analysis simply due to the influence of the contemporary dominant
mechanical philosophy. Whereas this might have been true in earlier writings
such as the Universal Natural History and the Only Possible Argument,¹⁸ where
the methodological instruction to extend the mechanical mode of explanation
as far as possible seems to follow from an assumption as to what is more phil-
osophical, in the third Critique Kant grounds this instruction in the peculiar na-
ture of the human understanding. As Kant puts it, “In accordance with the con-
stitution of our understanding […] a real whole of nature is to be regarded only
as the effect of the concurrent moving forces of the parts.”¹⁹
In addition, my interpretation also brings to the fore the uniqueness of tele-
ology and the peculiarity of the human understanding coming into play in this
context. It elucidates why explaining organisms is different from explaining in-
animate phenomena, and it does so in a way that is not dependent, as Guyer sug-
gests, on arbitrary limitations placed on scientific explanations or on human
psychological conditioning.²⁰ Kant’s requirement of teleological explanations
in certain cases is not an empirical or a psychological observation but rather
a fundamental conceptual point, which is part and parcel of his transcendental
analysis of human cognition and knowledge. Since the human understanding is
constituted so that it must proceed from the parts to the whole and not the other
way around, in explaining things regarded as objects in which the parts and the
 McLaughlin: Kant’s Critique of Teleology, 171 f.
 See for example Kant: BDG, AA 02: 126 f., 134– 137.
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 407.28–30: “Nach der Beschaffenheit unseres Verstandes ist […] ein reales
Ganze der Natur nur als Wirkung der concurrirenden bewegenden Kräfte der Theile anzusehen.”
 Guyer: Kant, 348f., 358.
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whole reciprocally depend on one another, it must appeal to a representation of
the whole and thus to final causality.
Now whether organisms are in actual fact things that we must teleologically
explain is an open question. In contrast to what is implied in Guyer’s discussion,
there is no consensus among biologists and philosophers of biology regarding
this question. Eminent figures in these fields still think that organisms display
unique features and that biology is not reducible to physico-mechanical explan-
ations.²¹ In any case, the crucial thing is that Kant’s discussion presents a point
of principle. The human intellect is constituted to form mechanical explanations
and therefore may fail in providing satisfactory explanations of objects which do
not readily lend themselves to this type of explanation. At the very least, organ-
isms draw our awareness to the fact that there is no a priori guarantee that all
the objects we ever come to cognize will fit the mechanical type of explanation.
Accordingly, it may be more fitting to read the teleological maxim as follows. In-
stead of literally reading it as asserting that ‘some products of material nature’
(einige Producte der materiellen Natur) cannot be explained purely mechanically
and an appeal must be made to final causes in order to explain them, one should
read it as claiming that some possible material objects may not be explained
purely mechanically and an appeal must be made to final causes in order to ex-
plain them. It is the empirical encounter with organisms that draws our attention
to this possibility, and thereby leads us to the teleological maxim. But again, al-
though this empirical encounter with organisms leads us to the teleological
maxim, it does not make the maxim itself empirical or merely psychologically
necessary. As Kant clearly explains, the necessity that this maxim embodies
“cannot rest merely on grounds in experience, but must have as its ground
some sort of a priori principle”.²²
 See for example Mayr, Ernst:What Makes Biology Unique? New York 2004; Ayala, Francisco:
Evolution and the Autonomy of Biology. In: Aquinas, 43 (2000), 283–312.
 Kant: KU, AA 05: 376.18–22: “kann es nicht bloß auf Erfahrungsgründen beruhen, sondern
muß irgend ein Princip a priori […] zum Grunde haben”.
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